football players, mummies, Arab sheiks, and members of Sgt. Pepper's band-were to encircle the Pentagon, levitate it 300 feet into the air, and exorcise its evil spirits. Mailer saw in that self-consciously theatrical inspiration new worlds of possibility, as yet undreamed of by timid liberals and cautious academics. Political protest had never before seemed so redolently "symbolic." "The new generation," he declared, "believed in LSD, in witches, in tribal knowledge, in orgy, and revolution. It had no respect whatsoever for the unassailable logic of the next step: belief was reserved for the revelatory mystery of the happening where you did not know what was going to happen next; that was what was good about it" (86) ."Politics had again become mysterious" (86) .
Throughout the sixties, of course,Americans seemed to be catching up with Mailer, discovering the countercultural challenges to orthodox liberalism that he had been championing since the early fifties. Everywhere complaints against science and rationality became increasingly common, and invocations of the irrational and mysterious took on newfound authority. "Magic, that old antagonist of science," Theodore Roszak claimed, transmuted "our workaday reality into something bigger, perhaps more frightening, certainly more adventurous than the lesser rationality of objective consciousness can ever countenance."The shaman was "the culture hero par excellence" because he saw beyond the workaday world and "glimpsed an alternative reality." 11 But what Mailer discovered in the march on Washington was something both more specific and more far-reaching in its implications than simply a rising doubtfulness about the perils of excessive rationalism. For his invocation of the "symbolic" amounted to a wholesale reconsideration of what counted as politics and what mattered to literature. In Mailer's eyes, as well as in those of an increasing number of his contemporaries, organized political life in the U.S. had become irrelevant over the course of the postwar decades. As Jerry Rubin put it, in words quoted by Mailer, the official institutions of government were "not a source but a servant of the real power in America" (226). In response, Mailer and Rubin both aimed to tap into the more symbolic and mysterious agencies that they believed shaped the thoughts and dreams of the nation's citizens. Mailer deemed his own work of such importance precisely because, partaking in that larger mystery, it leapt beyond the traditional restraints of literary culture and cut to the core of the nation's unconscious life.
To be sure, leftists during the sixties had many reasons to be disappointed and angry with mainstream liberalism. It was true, as the New Left pointed out, that the Kennedy administration had been far more interested in prosecuting the cold war abroad than in pursuing social justice at home, and that the Johnson administration's commitment to the Vietnam War was a moral outrage that fatally undermined the am-bitions of the Great Society. Nevertheless, it's important to note that the New Left's hostility to the Democratic Party, like the doubtfulness about electoral politics generally, preceded and ran deeper than reactions to the major events of the era. Mailer's own theoretical debts went back to the forties, to remnants of an anti-Stalinist left whose disenchantment with the Communist Party and distaste for mass politics had fostered an acute sensitivity to the evils of totalitarianism and a deep suspicion of the powers of the state. Twenty years before The Armies of the Night, Lionel Trilling had anticipated Mailer's dissatisfaction with institutional politics. "Organization means delegation, and agencies, and bureaus, and technicians,"Trilling complained, invoking against the tyranny of bureaucracy an intensified appreciation of "the emotions and the imagination." It was "no longer possible," he declared,"to think of politics except as the politics of culture." 12 No surprise that Trilling's student Marshall Berman would later draw on that attitude to describe the student activism of the late sixties as "modernism in the streets." 13 A still more revealing formulation might be found in the influential argument advanced by Mailer's contemporary (and in many ways kindred spirit) C. Wright Mills, in his account of what he called "the cultural apparatus." 14 Little known though it may be beside more current formulations of similar ideas (Althusser's ideological state apparatus, Foucault's discourse, Lacan or Zizek's symbolic order, Laclau and Mouffe's hegemony), Mills's account of the cultural apparatus nevertheless managed to put succinctly what would become reigning wisdom among American intellectuals for several decades to come. Combining attention to society's conventional cultural languages with a focus on the various institutions said to foster and prosper by their circulation, the concept of the cultural apparatus suggested both a new theory of power and a novel means of combating "the higher circles" of the "power elite." For, by Mills's account, among the most fundamental political facts were not merely economic forces or political institutions, but additionally the symbolic forms that determined people's identities, hopes, and expectations. "The consciousness of men does not determine their material existence; nor does their material existence determine their consciousness," Mills argued. "Between consciousness and existence stand meanings and designs and communications which other men have passed on-first, in human speech itself, and later, by the management of symbols. . . . The cultural apparatus is the lens of mankind through which men see. . . . It is the semi-organized source of their very identities and of their aspirations." 15 Eschewing classical theories that cast ideology as the expression of conscious manipulation or class interest, Mills thus defined his apparatus as utterly pervasive, but loosely-knit and only "semi-organized" in nature. Insofar as "the political directorate," for example, possessed great power, it did so principally because of its mastery of the symbolic forms that determined how people understood reality and because it could count on the crucial support of intellectuals who, consciously or unwittingly, perpetuated these forms.
The theory was perhaps naturally appealing to a new, universitytrained elite eager to exercise influence and frustrated by its sense of powerlessness. 16 Amounting in effect to a version of post-Marxism before the phenomenon had yet been given a name, the concept of the cultural apparatus offered an account of the political primacy of language and a gratifying vision of the crucial role to be played by intellectuals, who could be defined by the fact that they "professionally create, destroy, [and] elaborate . . . [the] symbols" that "stand between men and the wider realities of their time." Intellectuals in short were already "very much involved in all literate men's very images of reality."Were they to awaken to that fact and follow their professional inclination to assert their authority over the institutions that shaped their work, the political consequences could be enormous. To gain "control of the . . . means of cultural production" would be to begin to change the world. 17 The concept of the cultural apparatus was Mills's avowed response to the experience of intellectual alienation, and thus meant to provide a crucial link between the experience of personal frustration and political radicalization. Forging this link would become the continually reiterated mission of Mills's many followers in the New Left. Dismissing early the "labor metaphysic" of classical Marxism and the focus on economic security and inequality that had been central to New Deal liberalism, Mills staked his vision of a new left instead on the seething frustration he perceived among intellectuals and professionals-those "new research people" who were "disaffected" by the knowledge that "they sell their minds to people they don't like for purposes they don't feel at home with." 18 By Mills's lights, the urge those "cultural workmen" inevitably felt "to repossess our cultural apparatus and use it for our own purposes" made them natural spearheads of a new radicalism. 19 But it also meant that it would be "a waste of time and talent for American intellectuals to busy themselves with merely local and ineffective 'politics.'"There was "no movement or party or organization" that could address the demands of the intelligentsia. Like Mailer, Mills felt instead that "cultural struggle must be waged in intellectual and moral ways . . . in our own lives, in our own direct action, in the immediate context of our own work." 20 Mills's concern with the powerlessness and, alternatively, the grand mission of "the young intelligentsia" would remain a central theme of oppositional thought throughout the sixties. 21 And his consequent sense that intellectuals should abandon traditional partisan politics for the higher ground of "cultural struggle" would go on to become per-haps the main hallmark of the era's new radicalism. Indeed, it remains a staple belief among advocates of literary radicalism to this day, who frequently echo Mills's sense that politics begins, and often ends, in "our own work." Anticipating Roszak, Mills suggested that merely providing "alternative definitions of reality" could itself be the most radically political of acts. 22 Our complaint against this attitude does not concern the premise that symbolic or cultural forms are politically significant. Each of the essays in this volume begins from the premise that they are. Our complaint is against the assumption, evident in Mills and Mailer and countless other voices from the era, that analysis of these forms itself constitutes significant political action, or, equally, that the ability to affect culture is, independent of other means, also therefore politically efficacious.
The Libertarian Turn
Needless to say, there were many instances of highly significant political action during the sixties.There is no question that American society has been transformed by the new social movements that flourished during and after the era, especially by the Civil Rights movement and feminism and ultimately by the gay liberation and ecological movements as well. And it is equally beyond doubt that, however limited their victories may have been, the U.S. is an immeasurably better place because of these movements. But it is also the case that these transformations of American life took place during the rise to political preeminence of an enormously powerful conservative movement. If, as almost everyone agrees, the sixties were the foundational moment of our current order, "the birthplace of our own culture" as Tom Frank puts it, then they have left us, as he suggests, not only with something that looks like a permanent culture war, but with a regime in which the project of expanding civil liberties has coincided with an almost theological deference to the freedom of capital-one where the values championed by liberals, leftists, and marketing executives alike preside in the realm of social mores, even while a right-wing movement, unremittingly hostile to every form of social welfare, holds the upper hand in the formal political sphere. 23 The economic order that regime has created is one in which nearly every governmental effort to regulate or compensate for the excesses of the market has come under assault, if it has not already been eliminated; where organized labor has been critically enfeebled and the power of employers has advanced dramatically alongside the vulnerability of workers; where the organs of public opinion and cultural production are dominated by a small handful of media multinationals; where, finally, the distribution of wealth, and of taxation, is less equitable than at any time in living memory.
Hindsight is twenty-twenty, of course, and it is unfair at this late date to task the countercultural radicals of the sixties with political changes that would take decades to accomplish. But it is worth pointing out the sympathies that sometimes appeared between the New Left and their contemporaries on the New Right, the conservative movement that would later claim responsibility for our current state of affairs.The two movements shared not only a hostility to the staid manner of the fifties, but also a mutual distaste for the federal bureaucracy that Barry Goldwater dismissed as a "dime store New Deal."Writing in 1962, in what would be one of the era's most widely circulated tracts, Tom Hayden touted "thousands of young conservatives" for "the catalytic value of their social participation and the stirring they have caused among many students." Six years later the left-wing sociologist William Domhoff echoed Hayden's praise, urging student protesters to "make contact with . . . the New Right," whose members "share your view of the power structure and your desire for more individuality and local autonomy." 24 SDS president Carl Oglesby later described Left and Right, the journal of "libertarian opinion" that sought to forge links between the two movements in the sixties, as having articulated the "philosophical foundation" of his politics. 25 And the attitude he shared with Domhoff and Hayden was echoed by many similar expressions on the left that objected to the overweening power of the state while often referring nostalgically to the freedoms of an ostensibly fading free market.
It was easy for the New Left to look past its differences with the radical right, in short, because the two movements shared a basic antipathy to big government. A libertarian sensibility coursed through much of the era's countercultural fiction as well, from Ken Kesey's withering assaults on the mental health bureaucracy and labor unions to Thomas Pynchon's anarchist complaint against the state monopoly on the mail. 26 But it was not simply the counterculture's libertarian sympathies that hampered its ability to recognize and respond to the growing New Right, or that has left countercultural politics in such a debilitated condition to this day. Equally important was the movement's allied determination to follow Mills beyond the constraints of partisan politics toward the ostensibly higher ground of cultural struggle.This was the true heart of Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49 (1966) , an attitude aptly expressed midway through the novel when Pynchon's heroine Oedipa Maas finds herself crossing Berkeley's "jumping" Sproul Plaza, favorably impressed by "posters for undecipherable FSM's,YAF's,VDC's" and ruefully aware of the contrast to the "somnolent" atmosphere of her own education during the previous decade. Pynchon doesn't linger on these acronyms. For adopting something like the official rhetoric of the Free Speech Movement, Oedipa is impressed (as she will be throughout the novel) only by the sheer febrile activity of communication itself-"the sort that bring[s] governments down." As if by the same token, she is both ignorant of and indifferent to the diverse political positions represented by the signs she cannot read.The fact that they belong not just to the Free Speech Movement and the antiwar Vietnam Day Committee, but also to the insurgent New Right organization Young Americans for Freedom, makes the issue clear. 27 The point for Oedipa, and it seems for Pynchon as well, is not left versus right; rather, the point is to make the libertarian challenge to the state look like a choice of enthusiasm over complacence, the unknown over security. Effectively replacing partisan conflict with the distinction between the obvious and the mysterious, Pynchon makes the question of exactly what meaning might ultimately inhere in Berkeley's political activity, or in the diverse subcultures his novel celebrates, less important than the fact that it could be expressed in an unrecognizable mode different than the familiar. As the novel concludes, in a sentence whose rich semantic ambiguity implies that without mystery meaningful communication might itself be impossible, there is either "another mode of meaning behind the obvious, or none." 28 For Pynchon as for Mailer and many among their contemporaries, the irrational or the extraordinary or the miraculous helped to describe this other mode of meaning-and to forge in turn what the exorcists of the Pentagon called "suprapolitics" (121). It's certainly possible in many cases to read this turn as the product of resignation or understandable despair. As ex-Weatherman David Gilbert put it,"We went from being young kids with a moral vision, to realizing we were up against the heaviest power structure in the world. . . .And so people looked for almost what I considered magical solutions." 29 But in at least one prominent strain of rhetoric from the sixties, the problem was not the abuses or errors of an existing power structure, or even the enormous difficulty of describing an obscure network of institutional power that resisted definition and challenge, but rather the fact that such structures existed at all. Recalling the late sixties-those "impassioned, jubilant, enigmatic years"-and their profound influence on his intellectual development, Michel Foucault saw around the globe a similar phenomenon:"it was no longer acceptable to be 'governed'"-not just by "the government of the state and the men who represent it, but also" by "those men who organize our daily lives by means of rules, by way of direct or indirect influences, as for instance the mass media." 30 From this perspective, Foucault aptly noted, merely to sign on to "a political program," of any type, would be almost inevitably to embrace "abuse or political domination." 31 His suspicion of the programmatic was commonplace at the time.
For the widest spectrum of sixties radicalism, in fact, little embodied the failings of the liberal imagination quite so powerfully as the legacy of the New Deal and its bureaucratic efforts to counter the effects of chance and contingency in the name of security; and nothing would define the counterculture or the New Left quite so perfectly as its embrace of risk and the unforeseen. Any plan of action seemed in this context an overly rationalizing, managerial endeavor.As Tom Hayden put it, speaking in his 1964 master's thesis on Mills for a new generation of radicals, "We don't believe in any science of strategy and tactics." 32 A few years later, groups like the Yippies and the Diggers quite self-consciously styled themselves the progeny of a surrealist tradition infatuated with the conflation of chance and antibourgeois anarchism. From Black Mountain and Haight-Ashbury to the bustling enclaves of Soho and the East Village, bohemians were by the midsixties similarly championing a performance-art fascination with the unforeseen, as committed to épater la bourgeoisie as to the notion that formal experiment in the arts might transform society. Mailer thus explains that in 1967,"the New Left and the hippies were coming upon the opening intimations of a new style of revolution-revolution by theatre and without a script" (223). "What seemed significant here," Mailer observes, "was the idea of revolution which preceded ideology" (88) .
To the extent that the New Left and its peers adapted that attitude during the sixties, they tended to envision a distinct form of cultural politics-one increasingly less reliant on the notion that plays, poems, movies, and novels might change the world because they might lead to action in other more directly political contexts, and instead more attracted to the idea that performance itself functions as a kind of therapeutic rite aimed at the self-realization of its participants. At the same moment that the inventors of performance art and happenings were dismissing the notion that art should be representational in favor of the idea that it should aspire to be, as Susan Sontag put it, "incantatory, magical . . . an instrument of ritual," the era's countercultural radicals turned toward the similar notion that political protest should aim less to address state actors or fellow citizens than to provide what Paul Potter called "a breakaway experience" for its participants. 33 As Potter imagined the events of Chicago '68, street fighting and police brutality had not "changed the current political scene or something."
Rather, "what the demonstrations had accomplished was to completely turn our heads around." 34 Accordingly, countercultural street theater, so long as it remained true to Potter's own newly developed commitments, became less traditionally political and more committed to self-realization. To the same degree, it became-as in the oftrepeated line about putting one's body on the line-a politics built on bodily stances and experiences as opposed to words, beliefs, or policies.As Mailer proclaimed,"The future of the revolution existed in the nerves and cells of the people who created and lived with it, rather than in the sanctity of the original idea" (88) . Revolution without a script was thus to be more inductive than deductive, devoted to action unencumbered by an organizing design.As Mitchell Goodman put it, "no amount of reason alone will tell us what is happening, or where we are headed, or the nature of the change." 35 The Art of the Impossible That attitude recalled a radicalism that in many ways predated those liberal and Marxist traditions that had reached their heights of influence during the thirties."All pre-Marxist utopian thinking," reasoned Lewis Coser and Irving Howe in 1954,"tends to be ahistorical, to see neither possibility nor need for relating the image of the good society to the actual workings of society as it is. . . .The imagined construction of Utopia comes outside the order or flux of history: it comes through fiat." Marx, they maintained, changed that: he "was the first of the major socialist figures who saw the possibility of linking the utopian desire with the actual development of social life." For Coser and Howe, Marx would leave a scientific and rationalizing legacy, in which thinking in utopian terms can "be done meaningfully only if it is an image of social striving, tension, and conflict; an image of a problem-creating, and problem-solving society." 36 The New Left, along with the counterculture, rejected that historical utopianism and turned instead to something very much like the Protestant millennialism that Howe and Coser believed Marxism had left behind: a vision of the necessary relation between self-realization and revolutionary social transformation.
If this vision was especially alluring to some of the era's radical thinkers, it was equally so to literary artists and critics wanting to exemplify a new generation's refusal of problem solving. One such instance can be found in Ursula K. Le Guin's celebrated 1971 novel The Lathe of Heaven. Part of the wave of political science fiction to emerge out of the tumult of the New Left and the Women's Movement, Le Guin's novel offers an all but direct allegory in which a passive aesthetic sensibility comes to replace an illegitimate effort to transform the world through instrumental means. Le Guin's George Orr discovers that his dreams change the world; almost nightly he has what he calls "effective dreams" that reshape existence. Upon waking, Orr is the only one who recalls what the world used to be like, the only one who realizes that each night his mind refashions the lives of the planet's billions. Orr turns to government therapists to find assistance in ending his dreams, but is understood instead to be delusional and irrationally afraid of his unconscious. He is thus committed to the care of one William Haber, a state-employed psychiatrist who quickly discovers that Orr does indeed dream effectively, and who then tries to use Orr's dreams to rid the world of misery. Orr objects, and Le Guin organizes this novel around the ensuing debate between the two men over whether it's right to change the world.
In their state-mandated sessions, Haber uses hypnotic suggestion to direct Orr such that his dreams eliminate modernity's big-ticket problems: famine, disease, racism, war, and the degradation of the environment. But we are quick to learn that this kind of idealism comes at a high price. Every time Haber induces Orr to dream a better world, something in Orr resists; when told to solve the color problem, Orr dreams a world in which all are a dull and listless battleship gray; when told to end all human conflict, Orr invents an alien invasion that threatens earth from the sky. Awake, he tells Haber, "it's not right to play God with masses of people. . . . just believing you are right and your motives are good isn't enough." 37 Le Guin's sympathies are unambiguously with her dreamer, whose resistance to Haber's megalomania resembles both the New Left's resistance to traditional politics and the Women's Movement resistance to the New Left itself. 38 Haber does eliminate the many ills on which he set his sights: he brags to Orr that they have "Eliminated overpopulation; restored the quality of urban life and the ecological balance of the planet. Eliminated cancer as a major killer. . . . Eliminated the color problem, racial hatred. Eliminated war. . . . Eliminated-no, say in the process of eliminatingpoverty, economic inequality, the class war, all over the world." But Orr refuses to grant the importance of these accomplishments because, regardless of the outcome, he doesn't "want to change things." These were views consistent with the widely shared sense that technocratic solutions to social problems were invariably misguided. But, like Mailer and many of her contemporaries, Le Guin does not merely worry about the unintended consequences or heedless arrogance of technocratic power; she counters it to what by contrast appears a more fundamental spiritual and political accomplishment-a therapeutic acceptance of reality itself. "We're in the world, not against it," Orr responds,"you have to let it be." 39 It is in this context that Le Guin's appeal to what we now call identity becomes most visible. Changing the world appears to rob it of its truest value which, it turns out, is its capacity to "be," that basic state first celebrated by the Movement at the "Human Be-In" in early 1967.According to leading New Left thinkers Greg Calvert and Carol Neiman, the fundamental issue raised by the movement had been "the question of identity." 40 Le Guin's novel demonstrated the logical culmination of that concern. As thinking through change came to seem unavoidably compromised, many among the counterculture and the New Left began to suggest that it was natural instead to commit to existence itself, to accepting people, places, and events as they were, on their own terms.Wanting nothing less than absolute change ended up in this regard remarkably close to accepting the world for what it was. "I want to stop manufacturing my life and my politics," Paul Potter claimed in the same year Le Guin's novel appeared. His earlier years of activism, he explained, had given way to intensive work on his relationship with his lover."If there is a choice, it is that-to experience myself and my situation. But I'm not sure it is a choice. Rather, it makes more sense to say, it is what is happening." 41 The same eagerness to turn from manufactured politics to an acceptance of what was happening lay at the core of The Lathe of Heaven. But, in its self-consciously allegorical fashion, Le Guin's novel announces attitudes that characterize a surprisingly wide range of latetwentieth century American writing as well.Time and again, American writers in the decades following the sixties-especially those who cast themselves as pursuing broadly political ends-have, like Le Guin, pursued an ostensibly higher politics, one that, in eschewing the established institutions of government and organized forms of dispute and negotiation, often ends up withdrawing not only from traditional politics, but also from the very possibility of orchestrated change. Le Guin renders these higher politics literal: Orr learns to "let it be" with the help of two turtle-shaped extraterrestrials. "Crossing in mist" incants one; "What comes is acceptable" murmurs another. 42 But the work of many writers who followed is only slightly less mystical. Consider, for example, the work of perhaps the two most critically celebrated American novelists of the past several decades, Toni Morrison and Don DeLillo. Despite their evident differences, Morrison and DeLillo, both of whom published their first novels in the early seventies, share more than a little in common. Revered for their searching criticism of American society, both have followed the path charted by Le Guin and others to turn the counterculture's suspicion of bureaucratic rationality into something approaching a literary program. Each of their novels derides progress, enlightenment, and reason; each reveres the unknowable force of mystery; and each suggests that the most appropriate attitude toward mundane political conflict or social tension is the effort to transcend it. In both cases, moreover, the result proves to be a fundamental opposition between a quotidian realm of banal communication-or "dead language," as Morrison simply puts it-and the transcendent force of what she aptly calls "word magic." 43 Morrison in particular makes evident the way an effort to get beyond traditional political attitudes and strategies can lead to the sense that both are insignificant by comparison to the deeper, irrational sources of identity. For if, at one level, Morrison's fiction can be understood as an extended critique of the history of racial injustice and African American suffering, her more consistent target is less the evils of American racism than the narrow-minded conventionality of the black middle class. "They think they have outfoxed the whiteman," her novel Paradise (1998) characteristically discovers, "when in fact they imitate him." 44 By Morrison's account, politically minded African Americans seem almost fated to fall into this trap.The struggle to accrue wealth or knowledge or political power, the pursuit of integration or self-sufficiency, the use of protest or of violent self-defense-all these strategies appear hopeless in her novels, especially to the degree that they depend on the classic political agencies of voting, patronage, or even communal self-government. "As though there really was hope," Morrison says in Sula (1973),"the same hope that kept them . . . knee-deep in other people's dirt; kept them excited about other people's wars; kept them solicitous of white people's children; kept them convinced that some magic 'government' was going to lift them up." 45 It says a good deal about Morrison's perspective that in an oeuvre where ghosts and omens are ordinary, government and the other mundane modes of protecting one's interests appear magical.
That counterintuitive assumption works in this case because, like all Morrison's fiction, Sula first demonstrates how the African American community it depicts has been oppressed by a racist society, and then gradually shifts toward the conclusion that the most important consequence of that injustice comes in the way injury leads the people of the Bottom to grow unacceptably narrow and restrictive-too caught up in worldly concerns and too neglectful of the spiritual forces Morrison's novels inevitably invoke in their effort to leap beyond the ordinary social tensions they otherwise brilliantly anatomize."How exquisitely human was the wish for permanent happiness," Paradise concludes, putting the theme most directly,"and how thin human imagination became trying to achieve it." 46 The main complaint, in sum, is not that her characters have been unjust or even unjustly treated but that their sufferings have encouraged them to become bourgeois.The paradise referred to by the title of her recent novel is thus like the utopia envisioned by Le Guin's Haber-an ideal community that becomes oppressive less because its inhabitants pursue unlikely or authoritarian ideals than because they have not striven hard enough to throw off the yoke of conventional thinking.The alternative, therefore, is less to seek to constrain cruelty, than to pursue the extraordinary.As one of Morrison's ultimately enlightened characters discovers, his mind opens "toward another place-neither life nor death-but there, just yonder, shaping thoughts he did not know he had." 47 DeLillo, who shares Morrison's fascination with "something extraordinary hovering just beyond our touch," tells a remarkably similar story. 48 His protagonists consistently learn that, as he puts it in Underworld (1997),"the power of the state" is at once enormous and meaningless. Since government as DeLillo conceives it is a vast mechanism driven solely by the effort to hold off "apocalyptic change," it is bound to run aground on the simple fact most cherished by DeLillo: things go unpredictably wrong.There are "forces beyond your control, lines of intersection that cut through history and logic and every reasonable layer of human expectation." As in Morrison, a fascination with the limits of calculation runs hand in hand with a sacralization of the sublimely irrational. 49 But the more important corollary to DeLillo's investment in mystery lies in the belief he shares with Morrison that not merely the ambition to plan and calculate, but even the desire to deliberate and discuss is absurd. In her Nobel Prize lecture, Morrison contrasts dead, "statist language"-which has "no desire or purpose other than maintaining . . . its own exclusivity and dominance"-to an "unmolested language" best exemplified by the pure sound of "a cry without an alphabet." By this account, language appears most vital not only when disconnected from the ends of government, but when unimpaired by any semantics, or even by words themselves. Against "arrogant pseudo-empirical language crafted to lock creative people into cages of inferiority and hopelessness," Morrison embraces a vision of language whose "felicity" lies "in its reach toward the ineffable" and in its ability to recall a forgotten time "when language was magic without meaning." 50 DeLillo, too, embraces what he calls a "contempt for meanings," an attitude he explains with impressive directness in his first major novel The Names (1982), where, much as in Le Guin and Morrison, an appeal to the ineffable and irrational seems an indispensable escape route from the imperial extension of state power. 51 When DeLillo's story begins, his protagonist James Axton, a former technical writer now working as an analyst for a firm that sells "political risk insurance," is living in Athens, where he is daunted by the overbearing presence of the classical past.Though he sees the Acropolis in conventional terms, as the embodiment of reason-"what we've rescued from the madness. Beauty, dignity, order, proportion"-Axton feels little affection for the monument."It looms. It's so powerfully there. It almost forces us . . . to resist it." 52 As it turns out, the novel gives him good reason for that suspicion. For, by its conclusion, Axton will be revealed to have been working unwittingly for the CIA, and the implicit connection between his perception of the Acropolis and his misguided work analyzing economic and social data in the name of political security becomes clear.The CIA, DeLillo tells us, gives "a classical tone" to American government. 53 As in so much countercultural writing, reason is the language of clandestine state domination and Western imperialism.
The major work of DeLillo's novel, then, is to divide James Axton from his ambivalent, lingering faith in the authority of reason, just as George Orr must be separated from Haber and as Morrison's characters must be separated from the false promises of American democracy. In part, that goal is accomplished by the means relied upon in all of DeLillo's novels: showing the inevitable collapse and underlying fatuity of rational calculation. But in the main it occurs via Axton's transformative encounter with a murderous, quasi-religious sect that selects its victims by matching their initials to the place where they are to be killed. Axton's discovery of the sect and his effort to track its course eastward, from the Mediterranean through the Middle East and then to India, is much like the journeys south that figure prominently in nearly every novel in Morrison's oeuvre: a version of the romance narrative's sojourn into the mysterious and pre-rational realm that underlies the illusions of Western reason-"the otherworld of magic, art, and divination." 54 The epitome of this mysterious world comes in the sect's determination to see words not as representations or abstractions, but as objects themselves, replete with virtually sacred significance-an attitude that, as he is enlightened (or better, deenlightened),Axton too comes to share. Precisely to the extent that he believes "intended meaning is beside the point," Axton comes to see the elements of language as "ancient things, secret, reshapable." "The language of innocence" is one in which words come "flying out of " people "like spat stones." 55 The Names works out the implications of that theory of language in complex and subtle ways. 56 For our purposes, however, it is enough to note that they ultimately lead Axton to a redemptive appreciation of the triviality of reason and to an exuberant celebration of the failure of communication. In the last passage of his saga, Axton finally journeys back to the Acropolis, where he discovers its reality to be "utterly different" from the looming edifice he'd first perceived. "The Parthenon was not a thing to study but to feel. It wasn't aloof, rational, timeless, pure," but the expression of "a human feeling . . . deeper than the art and mathematics embodied in the structure." Axton perceives that depth above all in the fact that the Acropolis is crowded with "mass assemblies" in which "everyone is talking" at once. 57 But if this image first seems to imply a sense of the agora as the site of public deliberation, DeLillo makes clear that, just as in Morrison, what makes this moment redemptive is precisely the fact that people are not talking to each other, but speaking in glorious isolation. Imagining "another, clearer language," DeLillo claimed in an interview he gave while writing The Names that such a language might best be envisioned as "babbling": "a purer form, an alternate speech." 58 And that idea of a redemptive "glossolalia" is precisely what The Names points toward in its peroration, as Axton hears "German, French, Japanese, accented English"-"one language after another, rich, harsh, mysterious, strong." Indeed, it is the fact that the Acropolis is characterized by multiple, non-communicating tongues that enables DeLillo, much like Oedipa Maas in Sproul Plaza, to extract from the scene a redemptive vision of words as such, separated from any communicative purpose and raised thereby to the status of sacred utterance. For DeLillo, as for Morrison and Pynchon, language assumes a magical and anti-authoritarian power only to degree that it has nothing to say.
"Their Own Real Work"
The high-minded irrationalism evident in Morrison and DeLillo's writing, as in Le Guin's and Potter's, has become a prominent feature of turn-of-the-century American life. The deep investment in the therapeutic value of ineffable mystery, like the often knee-jerk disdain for mundane political efforts to work toward imperfect justice, is commonplace. Both are evident not just in the continued vitality of what might reasonably be called America's Third Great Awakening-the extraordinary wave of popular religious fervor that began to swell in the sixties and has not crested yet-but in a pop culture with a seemingly bottomless appetite for stories of vampires, angels, and witches. But the specifically countercultural contention that mystery might prove to be a higher form of politics has taken root nowhere more powerfully than in our universities' humanities departments and their now long-running indebtedness to the various crypto-spiritual theories that have combined to form the postmodern lingua franca. For, whether in the messianic visions of Walter Benjamin, the spectral shades of Jacques Derrida, the strangely rapturous optimism of Hardt and Negri's Empire, or the often apocalyptic antirationalism of poststructuralist philosophy generally, academic postmodernism has turned with increasing earnestness, as Gopal Balkrishnan has put it, to the unlikely promise of "magical serendipities." 59 Professors of literature have been most invested in these serendipities, adds John Guillory, in their tendency to imagine that, by the very nature of the fact that it draws on the non-rationalized realm of culture, their work taps into a special "'power' intrinsically finer, greater than that of science, a visionary power to which science, with its microscopes and telescopes, can never hope to aspire." 60 An attraction to the sorts of antirationalist ideas promoted by the counterculture and embraced by the New Left, as Guillory points out, is a tendency virtually built into the literary academic's deformation professionel.
That's not to say that professors of literature haven't embraced such ideas out of genuine intellectual and political conviction. But as Norman Mailer suggested when he noted the connection between countercultural politics and "literary work," there is also a sense in which the magical serendipities prevalent in the discourse of the literary humanities comport quite well with the professional interests of academic humanists-as, in fact, they also may have done in less evident ways in the case of the sixties' various cultural radicals.That suggestion may seem counterintuitive given the deep antidisciplinary sensibility shared by the counterculture, the New Left, and postmodern intellectuals.The cultural radicals of the sixties lamented the coercive banality of a materialist society and railed against the evils of bureaucracy. Likewise, their successors in the literary academy often establish their own radical bona fides by challenging their disciplines, championing boundary-breaking work that defies the constraints of departmentalization and celebrating everywhere the virtues of fluidity, indeterminacy, liminality, hybridity, etc. 61 Neither group, it might seem, would give much deference to professional interests or show much concern for the disciplinary structures traditionally important to professional organization.
But however earnestly academic humanists in recent decades set out to challenge the "heritage of disciplinary investments and exclusions" (along with the dark "history of social effects" presumed to accompany them), and however much those efforts appear as "crucial political challenges" to both academy and society, relatively few academic intellectuals impair their professional chances by taking up an "aggressively anti-disciplinary" stance. 62 Whatever other ends it may serve, being anti-academic turns out quite frequently to be a successful path to academic advancement.The connection is far less obvious in the case of the counterculture or the New Left, but there too the antibureaucratic sensibility propagated by the era's cultural radicals was often consistent with the interests of aspiring young members of the postwar era's burgeoning professional class and, more significantly, sometimes directly inspired by an investment in the professional ethos of autonomous vocation.
In his influential complaint against the way the once "free" professions of law, medicine, and engineering seemed to be increasingly displaced by corporate organization, C.Wright Mills had put the question of professional status at the very core of the postwar era's new radicalism. Bureaucratic "specialization," Mills worried, was already replacing "self-cultivation" as the mainstay of professional life. 63 His followers among the New Left took up the argument with still greater urgency. Recalling the origins of the movement, for example, Todd Gitlin found them among "educated radicals" whose "principle property" was their "knowledge credentials"-young people especially "angry at managers whose power outran the knowledge that would entitle them to legitimate authority." 64 As Gitlin describes matters, the early New Left took for granted professionalism's basic premise that knowledge is the source of legitimate authority (much as the Free Speech Movement assumed that in the late twentieth century,"ignorance will be the definition of slavery" 65 ).What Gitlin's activists most despised was not professionalism per se, but bureaucratic management and, in particular, its capacity to interfere with the independent operation of professional expertise.
When Mario Savio, for example, complained in his famed 1964 oration "An End to History" that "depersonalized, unresponsive bureaucracy" was perhaps "the greatest problem of our nation," he identified among its principle evils the fact that, in order to become "part of the system," university graduates "must suppress the most creative impulses that they have."What characterized the dissenters, Savio aptly noted, was that they would "die rather than be standardized." 66 Tom Hayden likewise claimed that the New Left drew much of its authority from "the moral experiences which are created now and then in our own work." 67 Identifying a main spring of the Movement in "the empty nature of vocational alternatives" open to well-educated young people, Hayden made a still more direct appeal to the political virtues of professionalism. An important achievement of the New Left, he claimed, was the way it had given rise to an "insurgency within American institutions . . . professors fighting their administrations, lawyers against the bar association, welfare workers against the political machine, muckrakers against the press establishments." That insurgency, he predicted, was "bound to increase as the new generation of student activists graduates into the professions." 68 Within a few years, countercultural thinkers like Paul Goodman and Thomas Pynchon gave the notion a typically millenarian gloss. In the growing restiveness of "the new professional and technological class," Goodman saw the promise not just of appealing political outcomes but of a whole spiritual transformation of the modern world-a "New Reformation." Pynchon agreed. In the unpredictable innovations of "technocrats" lay, he imagined, the contemporary world's "best . . . hope of miracle." 69 For each of these thinkers, a central dynamic of the sixties lay in the conflict between the professional demand for autonomy and selfcultivation, on the one hand, and the restrictions of bureaucratic organization, on the other. What each could be said to articulate is an awareness of the emerging tension between what sociologist Erik Olin Wright has described as "skill assets" and "organization assets"-between, that is, the productive resources implicit in the inalienable qualities of talent and trained ability, on the one hand, and those implicit in the control of complex organizations, on the other: between, in short, the interests of professionals and those of managers. 70 Even as various left intellectuals were developing a theory of "the professionalmanagerial class," in other words, and had begun to float the idea that such a class could become a new progressive vanguard, that cohort had already begun to break apart into its component, and inconsistent, parts. 71 And as Gitlin, Savio, and Goodman all intuitively realized, it was on the professional side of that divide-with its interest in autonomy, creativity, and education (and its lack of interest in what Wright calls the "loyalty dividend" earned by dedicating oneself to an organization)-that the values of the New Left and the counterculture had most purchase. 72 What the most perceptive of the era's radicals saw, in other words, was that highly educated young people had a natural inclination to seek out the widest opportunities to nurture and to control their abilities and that this inclination placed them at odds with institutions that valued discipline and predictability. As Hayden and Goodman realized, a little noticed but important battle was shaping up between young professionals and the very organizational structures that had shielded their disciplines but that increasingly seemed hidebound and outmoded: lawyers against the bar, welfare workers against parties and institutions, academics against the academy.
As with the more directly political legacies of the sixties, the consequences of those developments turned out to be almost wholly unexpected. For while a good deal of sixties radicalism, as well as reformism, drew implicitly from a lingering ideology of the professional as "social trustee"-appealing to professionalism's traditional ideal of public service and to its distrust of pecuniary motivation-the demand for greater professional autonomy and the increasing doubtfulness about public institutions fed into the erosion of that very ideology and, along with other factors, fueled the growth of an emergent, alternative vision of "expert professionalism." 73 In this newer version of professionalism, which gained in prominence from the mid-sixties onward, the professional is the master of valuable knowledge and ability, but owes no special debt to the public good and needs no nonmarket, ideological defense. In the ever-growing influence of that vision-and in the rapid transformation of the professions away from their traditional status as anticompetitive, self-regulating institutions, toward something more akin to marketing associations-we find a new, more entrepreneurial version of expert vocation, one that proposes no justification for itself beyond efficiency.Where earlier in the century there had seemed to be a natural affinity between professionalism and the regulatory state, expertise in recent decades has been increasingly suited to the market, antagonistic to government, and indifferent to the public sphere. 74 That transformation has been apparent in various degrees in each of the major professions, nearly all of which grew vastly more specialized, open to market competition, and disinclined to the rhetoric of public service over the course of the last several decades of the twentieth century. It has echoed in more diffuse fashion throughout civic life, reaching a fever-pitch during the nineties, when the New Economy gave rise to countless celebrations of the independent-minded, rule-breaking go-getter whose creative thinking-"outside the box"-swept aside all that had previously constrained his particular industry. But perhaps nowhere have its cultural effects been more evident than in the rapidly commercializing university, and in the contemporaneous explosion of libertarian theorizing in the humanities, where the radical antistatism and millennial fantasies of the late New Left made common cause with ever more abstruse and manifold forms of professional expertise. 75 The young turn to magic, Rosazk held in 1969, because "they are seeking to ground democracy safely beyond the culture of expertise." 76 Some thirty-five years later, magic seems constitutive if not of the culture of expertise generally, than of the expertise brought to the study of culture.
This has been the case most especially in literature departments, which select for those eager to push past boundaries and break longaccepted assumptions and practices, and where invocations of radicalism have become an important criterion for professional success. Defending "Cultural Studies," for example, as an antidiscipline capable of drawing on several "major bodies of theory" ("from Marxism and feminism to psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, and postmodernism"), the leaders of the school were quick to point out that it was not a method subject to "codification" but a form of "alchemy." The most prominent voices of the "New Historicism," Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, spoke in remarkably similar terms in defense of their own epistemological and theoretical eclecticism, a "commitment to particularity" which aimed "to subvert a programmatic analytical response" in pursuit of a "quasi-magical" encounter with "the real." Whatever their other differences, both denounced the banality of method in favor of the sprezzatura of expertise-a kind of virtuoso performance that could appear, like alchemy, at once pseudo-scientific and magical and that, as Gallagher and Greenblatt write, "return[ed] our own professional skills to us as more important, more vital and illuminating, than we had ourselves grasped." 77 The most familiar term for this new style of literary professionalism, of course, is "theory"-a baggy designation for an intellectual and institutional formation whose hard-won hegemony over the academic humanities appears lately to be fraying around the edges. 78 Now that its authority seems on the wane, and the fierce battles that accompanied its triumph largely forgotten, it may be possible to gain a clearer sense of the elements most important to that formation and to some of the intellectual and political limitations it inscribed. As Guillory points out, the arrival on American shores beginning in the midsixties of various, loosely grouped versions of French structuralist, and "post-" or "neo-" structuralist, philosophy, and the ensuing vogue for "theory" in American departments of literature, played a pivotal role in the transformation of the profession of literary study-lending credibility to its claims to technical expertise and simultaneously legitimizing a change of values whereby the field's long-established defense of the ineffable powers of literature, once strongly associated with tradition and the right, came to seem instead the face of a new style of progressivism. 79 It was "theory," in short, that presided over the intellectual marriage of professionalism and a newly fortified version of the ethos of the counterculture. And it was "theory" as well that lent intellectual credibility to libertarian attitudes that would dominate the literary academy in the last decades of the twentieth century and that retain a predominant, if increasingly sclerotic hold on the humanities to this day. 80 Though rarely acknowledged directly, libertarianism runs through the diverse styles of poststructuralist theory. But its most illuminating expression may appear in the American preeminence of Michel Foucault and in the extraordinary influence of what Foucault called his "'cultural' attack" on the "statutory domain" of ordinary politics. 81 Far more directly than any of his contemporaries, Foucault expressed sympathy for the attitudes of the New Left, in the U.S. as well as in France, and for the counterculture more generally-going so far, indeed, as to suggest that his own work pursued the same struggle against "cultural conservatism" and "our bourgeois life" that he perceived in the stylistic rebellions of the young. 82 "It is possible," he suggested in 1971,"that the rough outline of future society is supplied by the recent experiences with drugs, sex, communes, other forms of consciousness, and other forms of individuality." 83 More than any other thinker, therefore, Foucault gave credibility to the notion that those rebellions pointed toward an alternative style of politics that might legitimately supplant both traditional leftist opposition and mainstream representative democracy. Like the counterculture and the American New Left, he vehemently rejected the Marxism of the old left (with its "pretty dubious notion of class justice"), while simultaneously preserving the eschatological dimension of revolutionary politics. 84 Much as in the American context, the result was a yearning for largely incommunicable, millennial alternatives to the existing world. Adopting the stance common among countercultural thinkers in the U.S., Foucault claimed that merely "to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the current system," and appealed instead to "heterotopias," which rather than "afford consolation" as utopias were said to do, served instead to "stop words in their tracks." 85 And much as in the U.S., a corollary of that yearning was the assumption that politics involved the pursuit less of particular goals than of spontaneous self-creation.Admiring the student radicals of May '68, Foucault commented in terms remarkably similar to those of Norman Mailer: "They are not making the revolution . . . they are the revolution." 86 Indeed, by Foucault's own account, the "enigmatic years" of the late sixties amounted to the crucial event in his philosophical and political development, clarifying the issues at the core of his early work and prodding him to extend his interest in "the implicit systems which determine our most familiar behavior without our knowing it." 87 That
Foucault should have gone on to flourish on American shores is hardly surprising, for in many respects his subsequent work built on attitudes already popularized by the counterculture and the New Left, giving them a more rigorous philosophical pedigree and a more darkly pessimistic emphasis, but preserving their fundamental presuppositions. If American countercultural radicals had worried about the system's suppression of personal development, Foucault offered a still more intense concern with normativity, stressing above all "the right to be different" and attacking what he would eventually denounce as "the government of individualization." 88 If American critics had seen the worst political dangers in bureaucratic organization, and often appealed against it to the power of the magical and irrational, Foucault similarly stressed the determining role of rationalizing institutions and invoked as a response an "insurrection of subjugated knowledges," or "anti-sciences," whose "naïve" qualities might challenge "the established regimes of thought." 89 If, like the earlier avant-gardes they imitated,American cultural radicals sometimes cast their aims as a joyous destruction of the boundaries between art and everyday life, Foucault similarly celebrated the new movements of the sixties and seventies for the way they realized in action attitudes tolerated once "only within literature." 90 But still more revealing than the carefully hedged countercultural affiliations running throughout Foucault's work is the close association he drew between those attitudes and an enthusiastic vision of expert knowledge. Having once described his own vocation as that of an "artisan doing a piece of work and offering it for consumption," Foucault went on to celebrate a similar style of cultural production in the activity of people he famously called "specific intellectuals"-a model of the trained intellect that, as Zygmunt Bauman notes, dispatches the Sartrean ideal of the public philosopher and replaces it with a new vision of the specialist. 91 In Foucault's admiring account, specific intellectuals are, first of all, "magistrates and psychiatrists, doctors and social workers, laboratory technicians and sociologists."They intervene in political matters not, say, in pursuit of "a just law" or a "universal" principle, but "in the name of a 'local' scientific truth"-"where their own conditions of life or work situate them." 92 They are experts indifferent to the claims of public discourse and, much as in Pynchon's or Goodman's invocation of the young professional, naturally hostile to the bureaucratic management associated with the state.
No surprise, then, that as in the larger development of professionalism generally, the U.S. literary academy's embrace of the attitudes associated with Foucault has tended to follow him toward an antipathy to the public sphere and to what, following Foucault's own optimistic prediction that "we are perhaps experiencing the end of politics," might be fairly called an antipolitical, or at least an antigovernmental, version of cultural activism. 93 In keeping with the directions charted by the New Left and the counterculture, Foucault, along with his American followers, systematically downplayed the role to be played by the formal institutions of political action (the state, but also parties, organizations, and the press) in order to emphasize the importance of what he called "moral" issues. 94 Pointing in his own defense of the "professional and technological class" to an inherent conflict between the powers of "the sovereign" and "matters of professional competence," Paul Goodman had suggested that "'sovereignty' and 'law'" might have become "outmoded concepts." 95 Foucault made a far more radical version of a similar point. In the same interview in which he invoked the "specific intellectual," Foucault made his famous call "to cut off the King's head"-to refuse, that is, to pose political issues with reference to "the State" or "in terms of . . . sovereignty." (Ironically, but not surprisingly, he suggested just as American New Leftists had that, if the state were relatively unimportant, "the university and the academic" by comparison might be "privileged points of intersection" in contemporary political struggle.) 96 The upshot was not just a dismissal of the formal sphere of political action and a consignment of the legitimate powers of government to the ash heap of history, but increasingly a denunciation of public debate and political disagreement about the proper aims of the state or the just purposes of law. Explaining what he had learned from the events of 1968 by remarking that he would not "play the part of one who prescribes solutions," Foucault suggested instead that the true intellectual refused to engage in public debate or political polemic, declined to play "the role of alter-ego" to "the political party," and preferred instead to reveal issues to be "of such complexity as to shut the mouths of prophets and legislators.""I play my role at the moment I make problems evident in all their complexity, by provoking doubts and uncertainties and calling for profound changes"-changes presumably of the "heterotopic" variety that would "stop words in their tracks." Society should be left to work out its own problems, without the interference of ideologues or governments and even ideally without deliberation or debate at all. "The most important thing is that . . . [problems] be tested and stirred up so deep within society to the point that society allows a new balance of relations to flourish by itself." 97 It is difficult not to see in that remark the mystified vision of society common to libertarian philosophies, where progress is brought about solely through the combined interaction of individual choices and the instrumentalities of the state turn out to be irrelevant.And indeed, during the seventies and eighties-when his seminar briefly considered the founding voices of contemporary libertarianism, Ludwig von Mises and Frederick Hayek-Foucault moved ever more radically away from political issues and ever more completely toward a therapeutic emphasis on, as he famously put it, the care of the self. 98 In the late sixties and early seventies, New Left thinkers like Greg Calvert and Carol Neiman similarly argued that the elision of personal emancipation and political change was one of the principal accomplishments of the countercultural left. Genuine change would come about only when the movement abandoned a "politics of guilt"-built around the "liberal-reformist" desire to alleviate injustice-and fully committed instead to "personal liberation." "The revolution," they declared, "is about our lives." 99 Though less grandiosely, the late Foucault says much the same."Care for others should not be put before the care of oneself," he suggests, a premise consistent with the aim of his late work to replace an emphasis on "political institutions" with a private "exercise of the self on the self." 100 Foucault's is merely the most striking version of a widely shared retreat away from public debate and civic engagement and toward a commitment to personal freedom. The libertarian premises that appear explicitly in his work are articulated in less direct ways throughout the whole range of poststructuralist theory. These premises are evident, for example, in Jean-François Lyotard's embrace of a "postmodern condition" that, as he recognized, corresponds to the increasing displacement of seemingly "permanent institutions" by "the temporary contract"-a development that he acknowledged makes efforts to contest injustice or inequality appear unlikely. 101 They appear more abstractly in Gilles Deleuze's analogous defense of a masochistic freedom of contract against the sadistic domination of institutions. 102 And they crop up throughout a range of theories that invoke the singular, the individual, and the inassimilable against the basic elements (norms, institutions, deliberation) of the public realm. 103 At the core of the poststructuralist consensus, as Lyotard noted, stands the shared premise that "consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value." 104 Such attitudes have long since become commonplace features of the American literary academy, whose attraction to the recondite discourse and libertarian sentiments of poststructuralist philosophy have been matched only by the frequently reiterated conviction that merely adopting that language amounts to a political challenge to contemporary society. If, however, that challenge always appears profound-cutting, as Foucault said, to "the fundamental codes of a culture"-its consequences by the same token inevitably appear imperceptible, and put off for a future accounting. 105 What lies between the apocalyptic and the mundane, of course-in that place otherwise occupied by formal political organization or the state-is mystery.
It is difficult to fault academic literary intellectuals for being drawn to the allure of that mystery. After all, few have easy access to Washington or the local statehouse. They do not as a group command much in the way of economic power. Nor do they have many strong connections to other constituencies. Turning that marginality into a source of authority, however, many academic humanists see the political universe entirely in symbolic terms, imagining, like Mailer, Mills and the New Left, that to change the cultural apparatus could be to change the world-that to provide, as Mills put it, "alternative definitions of reality" could itself be the most radically political of acts. 106 As our political and economic world has been shaped more and more by the prevalence of inegalitarian private agreements and weak public institutions, this longing for cultural power has left literary academics with ever less to say. Indeed, by at least one account, having nothing to say is how the academic left stays true to the sixties. Refusing to don "the pose of the ethically communicative replicant," Lauren Berlant suggests, is the way to remain "'68 or something."To resist "the bureaucratic impulse" one must embrace "the sublime productivities of political failure" and say "'something unspeakable.'" 107 That, we believe, is the dead end of cultural politics and an impasse long since time to step around. No doubt this notion will seem mistaken to many of our contemporaries.Those like Eric Lott who think that "the 60s" lives on most powerfully in a commitment to refuse the "liberal analytical division between symbolic politics and real politics" will continue to believe that "the realest way to intervene in matters of state" is to offer "continuing revelations" of the fact that "our relation to the state is by definition coerced, thus distant, thus mystified, thus, perforce, imaginary." 108 Readers who agree with this assessment might also agree with the editors of the recent volume Left Legalism/Left Critique who, believing that the most acute danger to "the left" today is not the vast power of the radical right but the fact that left ambitions have become "nearly indistinguishable from mainstream liberal ones," also believe that criticisms of postmodern radicalism betray an "impoverished understanding." But this attitude strikes us as exactly wrong. It is the romantic appeal to "the disruptive, disorienting" force of "vertiginous knowledge" that is impoverished; the fascination with the authority of "political inarticulateness" that is hackneyed and banal. 109 All the trappings of this sort of thinking, we believe, deserve the scrutiny of the type offered by the essays in this volume.The simplistic visions of both "reason" and "the state"; the related dismissal of formal politics; the conviction that ordinary language is in some significant way a prison house; and, above all, the inflation of self-realization to revolutionary importance-all of these notions deserve to be seen for what they have become: less concepts that might ever be evaluated or tested than aspects of a cherished and ultimately comforting folklore of the late capitalist economy.
